20 de octubre de 2017

John Dewey (1859—1952)

John Dewey (1859—1952)

Comparto información sobre la obra del filosofo y educador norteamericano John Dewey.

Fecha de su nacimiento 20 de octubre de 1859.



John Dewey was a leading proponent of the American school of thought known as pragmatism, a view that rejected the dualistic epistemology and metaphysics of modern philosophy in favor of a naturalistic approach that viewed knowledge as arising from an active adaptation of the human organism to its environment.

On this view, inquiry should not be understood as consisting of a mind passively observing the world and drawing from this ideas that if true correspond to reality, but rather as a process which initiates with a check or obstacle to successful human action, proceeds to active manipulation of the environment to test hypotheses, and issues in a re-adaptation of organism to environment that allows once again for human action to proceed.

With this view as his starting point, Dewey developed a broad body of work encompassing virtually all of the main areas of philosophical concern in his day. He also wrote extensively on social issues in such popular publications as the New Republic, thereby gaining a reputation as a leading social commentator of his time.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/dewey/

John Dewey
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER AND EDUCATOR

WRITTEN BY: James S. Gouinlock

John Dewey, (born Oct. 20, 1859, Burlington, Vt., U.S.—died June 1, 1952, New York, N.Y.), American philosopher and educator who was a founder of the philosophical movement known as pragmatism, a pioneer in functional psychology, and a leader of the progressive movement in education in the United States.

Dewey graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Vermont in 1879. After receiving a doctorate in philosophy from Johns Hopkins University in 1884, he began teaching philosophy and psychology at the University of Michigan. There his interests gradually shifted from the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to the new experimental psychology being advanced in the United States by G. Stanley Hall and the pragmatist philosopher and psychologist William James. Further study of child psychology prompted Dewey to develop a philosophy of education that would meet the needs of a changing democratic society. In 1894 he joined the faculty of philosophy at the University of Chicago, where he further developed his progressive pedagogy in the university’s Laboratory Schools. In 1904 Dewey left Chicago for Columbia University in New York City, where he spent the majority of his career and wrote his most famous philosophical work, Experience and Nature (1925). His subsequent writing, which included articles in popular periodicals, treated topics in aesthetics, politics, and religion. The common theme underlying Dewey’s philosophy was his belief that a democratic society of informed and engaged inquirers was the best means of promoting human 
interests.



Being, Nature, And Experience
In order to develop and articulate his philosophical system, Dewey first needed to expose what he regarded as the flaws of the existing tradition. He believed that the distinguishing feature of Western philosophy was its assumption that true being—that which is fully real or fully knowable—is changeless, perfect, and eternal and the source of whatever reality the world of experience may possess. Plato’s forms (abstract entities corresponding to the properties of particular things) and the Christian conception of God were two examples of such a static, pure, and transcendent being, compared with which anything that undergoes change is imperfect and less real. According to one modern version of the assumption, developed by the 17th-century philosopher René Descartes, all experience is subjective, an exclusively mental phenomenon that cannot provide evidence of the existence or the nature of the physical world, the “matter” of which is ultimately nothing more than changeless extension in motion. The Western tradition thus made a radical distinction between true reality on the one hand and the endless varieties and variations of worldly human experience on the other.

Dewey held that this philosophy of nature was drastically impoverished. Rejecting any dualism between being and experience, he proposed that all things are subject to change and do change. There is no static being, and there is no changeless nature. Nor is experience purely subjective, because the human mind is itself part and parcel of nature. Human experiences are the outcomes of a range of interacting processes and are thus worldly events. The challenge to human life, therefore, is to determine how to live well with processes of change, not somehow to transcend them.
Nature And The Construction Of Ends

Dewey developed a metaphysics that examined characteristics of nature that encompassed human experience but were either ignored by or misrepresented by more traditional philosophers. Three such characteristics—what he called the “precarious,” “histories,” and “ends”—were central to his philosophical project.

The precarious
For Dewey, a precarious event is one that somehow makes ongoing experience problematic; thus, any obstacle, disruption, danger, or surprise of any kind is precarious. As noted earlier, because humanity is a part of nature, all things that humans encounter in their daily experience, including other humans and the social institutions they inhabit, are natural events. The arbitrary cruelty of a tyrant or the kindness shown by a stranger is as natural and precarious as the destruction wrought by a flood or the vibrant colours of a sunset. Human ideas and moral norms must also be viewed in this way. Human knowledge is wholly intertwined with precarious, constantly changing nature.

Histories

TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE
Freddie Bartholomew (left) and Mickey Rooney in Little Lord Fauntleroy (1936). The Littlest of Them All

The constancy of change does not imply a complete lack of continuity with the past stages of natural processes. What Dewey meant by a history was a process of change with an identifiable outcome. When the constituent processes of a history are identified, they become subject to modification, and their outcome can be deliberately varied and secured. Dewey’s conception of a history has an obvious implication for humanity: no person’s fate is sealed by an antecedently given human nature, temperament, character, talent, or social role. This is why Dewey was so concerned with developing a philosophy of education. With an appropriate knowledge of the conditions necessary for human growth, an individual may develop in any of a variety of ways. The object of education is thus to promote the fruition of an active history of a specific kind—a human history.

Ends and goods
Since at least the time of Aristotle (384–322 bce), many Western philosophers have made use of the notion of end, or final cause—i.e., a cause conceived of as a natural purpose or goal (see teleology). In ethics, ends are the natural or consciously determined goals of moral actions; they are moral absolutes, such as happiness or “the good,” that human actions are designed to bring about. But such ends must be discerned before they can be fully attained. For Dewey, on the other hand, an end is a deliberately constructed outcome of a history. Hence, his expression “the construction of good” encapsulates much of the significance of his philosophy. A person confronted by a spontaneous intrusion of the precarious world into the seemingly steady course of his life will identify and analyze the constituents of his particular situation and then consider what changes he might introduce in order to produce, in Dewey’s parlance, a “consummatory” end. Such an end is a fulfillment of these particular conditions, and it is unique to them. Similarly, there is no such thing as an absolute good against which actions may be evaluated; rather, any constructed end that promotes human flourishing while taking into account the precarious is a good.

Instrumentalism
Dewey joined and gave direction to American pragmatism, which was initiated by the logician and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in the mid-19th century and continued into the early 20th century by William James, among other thinkers. Anticipating Dewey, James regarded reality as an array of “buzzing” rather than static data, and he argued that the distinction between mental experience and the physical world is “messy” rather than pristine. Another theme of early pragmatism, also adopted by Dewey, was the importance of experimental inquiry. Peirce, for example, praised the scientific method’s openness to repeated testing and revision of hypotheses, and he warned against treating any idea as an infallible reflection of reality. In general, pragmatists were inspired by the dramatic advances in science and technology during the 19th century—indeed, many had formal scientific training and performed experiments in the natural, physical, or social sciences.

Studio portrait of John Dewey.
Underwood & Underwood, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (negative no. LC-USZ62-51525)
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Dewey’s particular version of pragmatism, which he called “instrumentalism,” is the view that knowledge results from the discernment of correlations between events, or processes of change. Inquiry requires an active participation in such processes: the inquirer introduces specific variations in them to determine what differences thereby occur in related processes and measures how a given event changes in relation to variations in associated events. For example, experimental inquiry may seek to discern how malignancies in a human organism change in relation to variations in specific forms of treatment, or how students become better learners when exposed to particular methods of instruction.

True to the name he gave it, and in keeping with earlier pragmatists, Dewey held that ideas are instruments, or tools, that humans use to make greater sense of the world. Specifically, ideas are plans of action and predictors of future events. A person possesses an idea when he is prepared to use a given object in a manner that will produce a predictable result. Thus, a person has an idea of a hammer when he is prepared to use such an object to drive nails into wood. An idea in the science of medicine may predict that the introduction of a certain vaccine will prevent the onset of future maladies of a definite sort. Ideas predict that the undertaking of a definite line of conduct in specified conditions will produce a determinate result. Of course, ideas might be mistaken. They must be tested experimentally to see whether their predictions are borne out. Experimentation itself is fallible, but the chance for error is mitigated by further, more rigorous inquiry. Instrumentalism’s operating premise is that ideas empower people to direct natural events, including social processes and institutions, toward human benefit.

Democracy As A Way Of Life
Given its emphasis on the revisability of ideas, the flux of nature, and the construction of ends or goods, , one may wonder how Dewey’s philosophy could provide moral criteria by which purported goods may be evaluated. Dewey did not provide a thorough, systematic response to the question of how an instrumentalist determines the difference between good and evil. His typical rejoinder was that human fulfillment will be far more widespread when people fully realize that precarious natural events may come under deliberate human direction. Dewey made this claim, however, without sufficiently weighing the problem of how people are to choose between one proposed vision of fulfillment and another, especially when there are honest disagreements about their respective merits. 

Yet, while he never solved the problem, Dewey did address it in his philosophy of democracy, which he referred to as “democracy as a way of life.”

Dewey conceived of democracy as an active process of social planning and collective action in all spheres of common life. Democracy is also a source of moral values that may guide the establishment and evolution of social institutions that promote human flourishing. However, unlike other moral frameworks (e.g., great religious traditions or political ideologies), democracy as a way of life is neither absolutist nor relativistic, because its norms and procedures are fallible and experimental. It is a consciously collaborative process in which individuals consult with each other to identify and address their common problems; indeed, Dewey spoke of democracy as “social intelligence.” Within a fully democratic society, Dewey suggested, people would treat each other with respect and would demonstrate a willingness to revise their views while maintaining a commitment to cooperative action and experimental inquiry.

James S. Gouinlock
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Dewey

The Positive encourager
http://www.thepositiveencourager.global/john-deweys-approach-to-doing-positive-work/

VIDEO

https://youtu.be/zwIcl-G93Mo

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12 de octubre de 2017

Charles Taylor: Fuentes del yo.

El filósofo Charles Taylor, primer ganador del premio Berggruen

El galardón, dotado con un millón de dólares canadienses, distingue al pensador por sus ideas sobre "el autoconocimiento y crecimiento de la especie humana"

FRANCESC ARROYO
Barcelona 6 OCT 2016 - 11:24 CEST



El escritor y filósofo canadiense Charles Taylor, en Barcelona en agosto de 2015.


El escritor y filósofo canadiense Charles Taylor, en Barcelona en agosto de 2015. CONSUELO BAUTISTA

El filósofo canadiense Charles Taylor (Montreal, 1931) fue galardonado este martes con el premio que concede el Instituto Berggruen, fundado en 2010 para impulsar el diálogo y el pensamiento. El premio, que se concede este año por primera vez, está dotado con un millón de dólares canadienses (unos 676.000 euros). El jurado está compuesto por destacados pensadores y académicos, entre los que figuran el premio Nobel de Economía Amartya Sen, el médico Antonio Damasio, de la Universidad de Pensilvania y la matemática Alison Miller, de la Universidad de Harvard.

El director y fundador del Instituto, Nicolas Berggruen, destacó que la obra de Taylor ha contribuido a transformar el pensamiento sobre el mundo y sobre aspectos básicos de la vida humana. El presidente de la entidad, Craig Calhoun, resaltó el carácter intelectual y a la vez humilde de la filosofía de Taylor, así como su calidad humana y su capacidad para la enseñanza y el compromiso público.

Taylor estudió Historia en la Universidad McGill (Montreal), centro al que volvería como profesor después de haber completado sus estudios en Oxford, donde se doctoró en Filosofía con una tesis dirigida por Isaiah Berlin.

Ruth Abbey, compiladora de un volumen colectivo sobre la obra de Taylor, anota que, tras su jubilación, no ha dejado nunca de escribir, enseñar y dar charlas por todo el mundo. En España impartió unas conferencias el pasado año en Barcelona, coincidiendo con la traducción de La era secular (Gedisa), su penúltima obra. La última, The language animal, aparecida este mismo año, no tiene todavía versión española. La era secular son dos tomos que suman casi 1.200 páginas.

Taylor analiza el concepto de secularidad a lo largo de la historia, con especial atención al periodo que va desde el Renacimiento hasta hoy. Describe la construcción de un imaginario social que en economía tiene en cuenta tanto el interés social como el beneficio mutuo, mientras que considera la democracia (la convivencia basada en el consentimiento entre iguales) el mejor sistema político para administrar una esfera pública que, sostiene, si no existiera habría que fingirla. Como se ve, el proyecto inicial, el proceso de secularización occidental, queda ampliamente superado.

En unos tiempos en los que se anuncia que ya no hay posibilidad de visión global del mundo, Taylor demuestra en cada una de sus obras (y en el conjunto de ellas) lo contrario. El volumen citado de Abbey dedica cada capítulo a un aspecto de sus diversas aportaciones: la hermenéutica, la epistemología, la moral, la teoría política, el feminismo, la relación entre creencias religiosas y prácticas políticas. 

Y se podría añadir que nunca ha dejado de lado las reflexiones sobre filosofía de la mente y sobre la filosofía del lenguaje o sobre estética. “Para hablar como filósofo hay que leer literatura, escuchar música”, defiende. En su opinión, hay “muchas otras formas de expresar las cosas”.

Sus obras más difundidas son Fuentes del yo: la construcción de la identidad moderna, El multiculturalismo y "la política del reconocimiento", y La ética de la autenticidad (Paidós). En todas ellas se aprecia la clara influencia de Heidegger, pero también de Aristóteles. Taylor es un realista (tendencia que empieza a ser recuperada frente al posmodernismo dominante en Europa en las últimas décadas) convencido de que podemos tener conocimiento de un mundo exterior a nosotros. Es cierto que podemos plantearnos la posibilidad de que ese mundo sea realmente distinto a cómo lo percibimos, pero de la mano de la ciencia, las aproximaciones al mundo exterior tienen grandes posibilidades de acercarse a la realidad.

Taylor es firme defensor del pluralismo, en política y en filosofía. Pero el pluralismo no tiene por qué llevar al relativismo. En su opinión, se puede aceptar que la visión del mundo que nos aporta la ciencia es la más precisa, cuando utilizamos los lenguajes de la civilización occidental, asumiendo que hay otros tipos de aproximaciones a la realidad.

No obstante, en materia moral es condición más que recomendable intentar superar el subjetivismo, lo que no significa atrincherarse en la verdad y menos aún hacer proselitismo. El único pecado que no hay que tolerar, afirma, es la intolerancia.




Charles Taylor
CANADIAN PHILOSOPHER
WRITTEN BY: Ruth Abbey
See Article History
Alternative Title: Charles Margrave Taylor

Charles Taylor: CANADIAN PHILOSOPHER
Charles Taylor
ALSO KNOWN AS: Charles Margrave Taylor
BORN November 5, 1931 (age 85)
Montreal, Canada
POLITICAL AFFILIATION: New Democratic Party
SUBJECTS OF STUDY: individualism
secularism: self
AWARDS AND HONORS
John W. Kluge Prize For Achievement In The Study Of Humanity (2015)
Kyoto Prize (2008), Templeton Prize (2007)
VIEW BIOGRAPHIES RELATED TO
CATEGORIES: philosophy, DATES: November 5
RELATED BIOGRAPHIES

Jean Vanier, Jack Layton, Bernard d’Espagnat, Glen David Clark, Holmes Rolston III, Herbert Spencer, Thomas Mulcair, William Godwin, Martin Rees, Baron Rees of Ludlow, Jürgen Habermas

Charles Taylor, in full Charles Margrave Taylor (born November 5, 1931, Montreal, Quebec, Canada), Canadian philosopher known for his examination of the modern self.

He produced a large body of work that is remarkable for its range—both for the number of areas and issues it addresses as well as for the breadth of scholarship it draws upon. His writings have been translated into a host of Western and non-Western languages.

Taylor was raised in a bicultural, bilingual family with a Protestant, English-speaking father and a Roman Catholic, Francophone mother. After completing an undergraduate degree in history (1952) at McGill University in his native Montreal, Taylor earned a second bachelor’s degree in politics, philosophy, and economics (1955) at Balliol College at the University of Oxford. He was awarded a doctorate in philosophy at Oxford in 1961. Most of Taylor’s academic career was spent at McGill and Oxford; at the latter institution he held the Chichele Professorship of Social and Political Theory.

The Modern Self
Taylor’s first major work, Hegel (1975), was a large study of the 19th-century German philosopher that emphasized the ways in which Hegel’s philosophy continues to be relevant to contemporary political and social theory. In 1989 Taylor published Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, which explored the multiplicity of the self, or the human subject, in the modern Western world. Taking a historical perspective, Taylor showed that several strands and sources have gone into making the modern identity. 

A distinctly modern conception of selfhood thus encompasses a being who values freedom, who possesses inner depths that are deserving of exploration, who sees nature as a source of goodness and contact with it as renewing, who prizes authenticity and individuality, who affirms ordinary life, and who feels the pull of benevolence toward the suffering of others. These strands of Taylor’s modern self are sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory: the ideal of freedom, for example, has historically been associated with technological control over the natural world, which puts it at odds with the more Romantic view of nature as a source of goodness and renewal.

Meaning And Morality
It is hard to situate Taylor squarely within any particular philosophical school. Indeed, he is often described as bridging the gap between analytic (or Anglo-American) and Continental styles of philosophy. Influenced by the 20th-century German philosophers Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Taylor took a hermeneutical approach to the study of society, insisting that the meanings that humans give to their actions must be taken into acount by the social sciences.

Thus, one cannot explain voting behaviour, for example, simply by reference to the self-interested calculations of individuals. One must also consider that for many people voting is an important expression of their involvement in a democratic community. Taylor has been dubbed a communitarian for emphasizing the social nature of selfhood and the obligations that individuals have to the communities in which they live.

Taylor’s insistence on the importance of meanings creates a powerful awareness of the way meanings change over time and differ across cultures. Yet this variation does not lead him to deny the idea of a universal and unchanging human nature. He holds that certain features necessarily accompany being human and thus transcend differences of time, place, culture, and language.

Among them are: being self-interpreting (the way in which human beings understand themselves forms a significant part of their identity); being language animals (language mediates their relations to others, to the environment, and to themselves); and having identities that are constituted through dialogue. Taylor maintains that a person’s sense of self is not something that can be achieved alone: it depends on recognition from others for its realization.

Conversely, the failure to have one’s identity accurately acknowledged by others can distort or damage a person’s sense of who he is. Other features that all human beings share include: having purposes that play an important part in their sense of who they are; being located within a moral framework that orients individuals toward the things they most value and provides a sense of whether their lives are moving closer to or further from those goods; and being what Taylor called “strong evaluators.”

With the concept of strong evaluation, Taylor posits that individuals rank some of their desires, or the goods that they desire, as qualitatively higher than others; some are seen to be more worthy, valuable, meaningful, or important than others. The fact of strong evaluation means that humans are not simply weighers of preferences. Instead, in some of their choices, they make qualitative distinctions among the things they value or seek.

In his later work Taylor became more overt about the ways in which being a practicing Roman Catholic shaped his intellectual agenda and approach. Some hints about his religious views were dropped at the end of Sources of the Self, but after the publication of that work his remarks on this topic became more frequent and more explicit. Taylor, for example, injected himself into 21st-century debates about the role of religion in modern Western societies with his massive work A Secular Age, published in 2007.

A Secular Age tracks some of the major changes in Christian belief in Western societies during the last five centuries, examining how it has come to be that modern individuals can understand themselves, their society, and the natural world in a purely secular way, devoid of any reference to the divine or to a transcendent realm of any sort. 

What Taylor calls the “modern social imaginary” stands in direct contrast to the condition that obtained in 1500, when God was implicated in all areas of social and political life. Yet, despite the shifts in religion’s content and its social location over time, Taylor seems to suggest that humans necessarily have some orientation toward what he calls “transcendence”—some yearning for meaning that goes above and beyond the merely human.

In addition to his major works, Taylor published a large number of shorter works on topics as varied as freedom, democracy, nationalism, human rights, philosophical anthropology, cross-cultural understanding, moral theory, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and epistemology (theory of knowledge). In one of his well-known essays, “The Politics of Recognition” (1992), Taylor tried to provide a deeper philosophical explanation of why groups within Western societies were increasingly making claims for public acknowledgment of their particular identities, be this on the basis of gender, race, or ethnicity.

Taylor’s distinguished academic career was interlaced with political participation. He was active in the Canadian New Democratic Party (NDP), which promotes a social democratic platform, and ran a number of times (unsuccessfully) as one of its candidates for federal Parliament. He served on the Quebec government’s French Language Council and in 2007–08 cochaired a public inquiry into the future of cultural and religious differences in that province. He was appointed a member of the Companion of the Order of Canada, the country’s highest civilian honour, in 1996.

He was also a winner of the Templeton Prize for Progress Toward Research or Discoveries About Spiritual Realities (2007), the Kyoto Prize for significant contributions to the scientific, cultural, or spiritual betterment of humankind (2008), and the John W. Kluge Prize for Achievement in the Study of Humanity (2015).
Ruth Abbey

MORE ABOUT Charles Taylor
4 REFERENCES FOUND IN BRITANNICA ARTICLES
Assorted References
civil society (in civil society: Contemporary political discourse)
communitarianism (in communitarianism: Varieties of communitarianism)
libertarianism (in libertarianism (politics): Criticism)
view of disenchantment concept (in disenchantment)

11 de octubre de 2017

Adiós al progreso; Walter Benjamin

Adiós al progreso; Walter Benjamin



Publicación de El Pais. Parece ser que este periódico hoy publica cualquier cosa, como este escrito.

Walter Benjamin es hoy inspirador de las nuevas visiones que alertan sobre la tentación de basarlo todo en un futuro pluscuamperfecto
El Pais: 20 ENE 2017 - 23:52 CET

Para los anarquistas el tiempo de la vida no es el de la historia ni el de la naturaleza, indiferente a nuestros deseos y sentimientos. Quizás el tiempo sea cíclico, el eterno retorno de Nietzsche, o tal vez se parezca al trazado de una flecha, con un principio y un fin (alfa y omega). Para los atéos el cristianismo imagina un tiempo lineal: parte del pecado original y acaba en la salvación del juicio final. Sin retroceso. Desde el siglo XVIII, sin embargo, se ha dado en pensar en la historia como un camino hacia el paraíso en la tierra (entendido como mejora de las condiciones de vida). A eso se le llamó progreso: confianza en la capacidad del hombre para satisfacer las necesidades, reducir el dolor y alcanzar la felicidad o, al menos, acercarse a ella.

Robert Nisbet (un sociologo norte americano, izquierdista convertido) es quien, junto a John Bury (un diseñador de teatro norte americano), más ha trabajado la historia de la idea de progreso: “La humanidad”, escribió, “ha avanzado en el pasado, avanza actualmente y puede esperarse que continúe avanzando en el futuro”. Una idea hegemónica en Occidente desde Kant y Hegel hasta Francis Fukuyama (comparación atrevida por lo pretenciosa) . Si se prefiere, entre el incremento de la producción fruto de la revolución industrial y la crisis de 1973 que anunciaba el fin de un sistema basado en las energías no renovables. Y, en paralelo, su correlato político.

La confianza en el progreso era tal que incluso se veía en el arte, en la estela de la “querella de los antiguos y los modernos” en la que participó la mitad de la Europa intelectual del siglo XVII. No en vano los principales movimientos estéticos del siglo XX se agrupan bajo el epígrafe de vanguardias (el sino de los anarquistas).

Adiós al progreso Giorgio Agamben: “El ciudadano es para el Estado un terrorista virtual”

El marxismo es una de las filosofías de la historia (darle esta categoría es demasiado) que han afirmado la idea de progreso. También el capitalismo creyó en él hasta hace algunas décadas: el progreso era el resultado inevitable de unir libertad y ciencia. La especificidad del marxismo consistía en concebir la historia como una línea de avances que algunos creyeron predeterminada y necesaria: el feudalismo sucedió al esclavismo y fue sustituido por la revolución burguesa; luego venía el socialismo, fase de transición a la sociedad comunista igualitaria. Pese a que ya Kant había sostenido que el progreso existe, pero siempre cabe una vuelta atrás, acabó triunfando el entusiasmo progresista (Schopenhauer es la gran excepción). 

Luego llegaron la crisis del petróleo, las dudas sobre la capacidad de la naturaleza para satisfacer las necesidades de la humanidad y la evolución del llamado socialismo real (idea sin sentido). Un factor añadido fue el uso de la técnica como potencia destructiva. Buena parte de la ideología progresista se basaba en la creencia de que la ciencia era pura acumulación, mejora constante. (el escrito destila aberraciones).

Una fe reforzada por la teoría de la evolución. La historia era vista como supervivencia de lo mejor y muerte de lo peor. Hiroshima mostró que ni el saber estaba a salvo de convertirse en fuerza destructora. La crisis actual ha sido el remate. Manuel Cruz ironiza en su último libro al respecto: la humanidad ha batallado por conseguir la inmortalidad y ahora que parece al alcance de la mano, igual no vale la pena quedarse. Coincide con otros autores como Luciano Concheiro en ver la aceleración como característica del presente. (referencias a personas secundarias, que no guardan relación con las siguientes referencias)

Pero esa es ya otra mirada.

Se podía intuir, porque hubo advertencias contra esa idea de progreso. La más potente, la de Walter Benjamin cuando imaginó la historia a la luz del Angelus Novus de Klee: el ángel de la historia da la espalda al futuro mientras contempla un presente hecho de ruinas del pasado. Benjamin es hoy inspirador de estas nuevas visiones que alertan sobre la tentación de basarlo todo en un futuro pluscuamperfecto. Por citar algunos de los autores que desde hace un par de décadas lo frecuentan para seguir su propio recorrido: Giorgio Agamben y ­Giacomo Marramao, en Italia, y Juan Ramón Capella, en España, comparten un cierto pesimismo incapaz de renunciar a la esperanza.

Walter Benjamin: Percy C. Acuña Vigil
http://sargonauta.blogspot.pe/2014/04/walter-benjamin-el-pensador-vagabundo.html
Walter Benjamin: Percy C. Acuña Vigil
http://sargonauta.blogspot.pe/2015/11/walter-benjamin.html

Discursos Interrumpidos:
http://exordio.qfb.umich.mx/archivos%20pdf%20de%20trabajo%20umsnh/libros/16185881-

Benjamin-W-Discursos-interrumpidos-I-Filosofia-del-arte-y-de-la-historia.pdf

Contra la critica a la violencia: Walter Benjamin y Giorgio Agamben
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/towards-the-critique-of-violence-walter-benjamin-and-giorgio-agamben/

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